Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics Third Edition Chapter 3: Dynamics in aggregate demand and supply

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Outline



Introduction



- Stability analysis: graphical and mathematical
- Adaptive expectations and stability in the AS-AD model
- Building block: Capital accumulation perfectly competitive firms
- Capital accumulation and stability in the IS-LM model
- In Financing the government budget deficit and stability
 - Money financing and stability
 - Bond financing and stability
 - Comparison money and bond financing

Aims of this chapter

The principal aim of this chapter is to study the "intrinsic dynamics" in IS-LM type models. Particularly, we look at the following examples:

- The Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis (AEH) and stability in the AD-AS model
- Investment theory and the interaction between the *stock* of capital (K) and the *flow* of investment (I). This is yet another important building block for the course
- The government budget restriction, stability, stock-flow interaction, and multipliers under different financing methods
- Hysteresis and path dependency

AEH and stability Building block: Investment Capital accumulation and stability

What do we mean by stability?

Loose definition: System returns to equilibrium following an exogenous shock

Question: Why are we so interested in stable models?

- Unstable models are rather useless
- The Samuelsonian "correspondence principle" is very handy
- "Backward looking" stability arises naturally in IS-LM type models and is easy to handle
- "Forward looking" stability is a more recently developed form of stability but it can also be handled relatively easily

The AEH and stability in the AS-AD model

Assume that we have a simple continuous-time model in the tradition of the Neo-Keynesian Synthesis:

> $Y = AD(G, M/P), \qquad AD_G > 0, \quad AD_{M/P} > 0$ $Y = Y^* + \phi [P - P^e], \quad \phi > 0$ $\dot{P}^e = \lambda \left[P - P^e \right],$ $\lambda > 0$

where $\dot{P}^e \equiv dP^e/dt$ and Y^* is full employment output (output level consistent with full employment in the labour market)

- The AD curve depends positively on both government consumption (G) and on the level of real money balances (M/P)
- The AS curve is upward sloping in the short run because of expectational errors
- Expected price level adapts gradually to expectational error

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
Graphical stability analysis

Example of graphical stability analysis: Trace the dynamic effects of a permanent increase in government consumption

- See Figure 3.1 for the graphical derivation. Key effects:
 - $G\uparrow$ so that IS and AD both shift up
 - ${\: \bullet \: } P^e$ is given so that short-run equilibrium is at point A
 - In point A, $P^e \neq P$ (expectational disequilibrium)
 - Since $P > P^e$, $\dot{P}^e > 0$ and AS_{SR} starts to shift up
 - ${\scriptstyle \bullet }$ Economy moves gradually along the AD curve from A to E $_1$
- We can conclude from the graph that the model is stable!

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Figure 3.1: Fiscal policy under adaptive expectations



Can we do this analytically?


- This is useful if the model is too complicated to analyze graphically
- Stability holds in our model provided \dot{P}^e dies out (goes to zero)
- In a *phase diagram* the stable and unstable cases look like in Figure A
- From the diagram we conclude that we must show that for a stable model the phase diagram slopes downward:

$$\frac{\partial \dot{P}^e}{\partial P^e} < 0$$
 (stability condition)

• Note that a model may be non-linear. All we do is prove *local stability*, i.e. stability close to an equilibrium.

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Figure A: Phase diagram



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Can we do this analytically?

 In our model we must take into account that P depends on P^e (and the other exogenous variables):

$$P = \Phi(G, M, Y^*, P^e)$$
(S1)

• We use AD and AS to find $\Phi_{P^e} \equiv \partial P / \partial P^e$ with our implicit function trick:

$$dY = AD_G dG + AD_{M/P}(M/P) \left[\frac{dM}{M} - \frac{dP}{P}\right]$$
$$dY = \phi \left[dP - dP^e\right] + dY^*$$

and solve for dP:

$$dP = \frac{\phi dP^e + AD_G dG + AD_{M/P}(1/P) dM - dY^*}{\phi + AD_{M/P}(M/P^2)}$$

• We conclude that $\partial P/\partial P^e=\phi/\left[\phi+(M/P^2)AD_{M\!/\!P}\right]$ which is between 0 and 1

Can we do this analytically?

The AEH implies:

$$\dot{P}^{e} = \lambda \left[\Phi(G, M, Y^{*}, P^{e}_{+}) - P^{e} \right] \equiv \Omega(P^{e}, G, M, Y^{*}) \quad (S2)$$

• By partially differentiating (S2) with respect to P^e we find:


$$\frac{\partial \dot{P}^e}{\partial P^e} = \lambda \left[\Phi_{P^e}(G, M, Y^*, P^e) - 1 \right] \\
= \lambda \left[\frac{\phi}{\phi + (M/P^2)AD_{M/P}} - 1 \right] \\
= -\lambda \left[\frac{(M/P^2)AD_{M/P}}{\phi + (M/P^2)AD_{M/P}} \right] < 0 \quad (S3)$$

 ${\, \bullet \, }$ We conclude that $\partial \dot{P}^e/\partial P^e < 0$ so that the model is stable

• We can integrate the stability analysis with the fiscal policy shock in **Figure 3.2**

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Figure 3.2: Stability and adaptive expectations



AEH and stability Building block: Investment Capital accumulation and stability

Test your understanding

**** Self Test ****

Phase diagrams are very important in modern macroeconomics. Make absolutely sure you feel confident working with them! If you don't understand these simple (one-dimensional) phase diagrams you will have trouble later on!

Building block: A first look at investment theory

(Recall our earlier building blocks: demand for labour by firms, supply of labour by households, demand for money by households.) We are now going to start the development of a theory of investment, i.e. the accumulation of *capital goods* (such as machines, PCs, buildings, etcetera) by firms. Basic ingredients:

- Adjustment cost model
- Firms now choose both employment (as in Chapter 1) and investment
- Simplifying assumptions: static expectations, perfect competition

Building block: A first look at investment theory

• Production function still given by:

$$Y_t = F(N_t, K_t)$$

Need time subscript because investment decision is dynamic

- Choices made now affect outcomes in the future
- Example: just like the decision to educate oneself
- Timing: K_t is the capital *stock* at the beginning of period t
- Properties as before: positive but diminishing marginal products ($F_N > 0$, $F_K > 0$, $F_{NN} < 0$, and $F_{KK} < 0$), cooperative factors ($F_{NK} > 0$), and CRTS
- Accumulation identity:

$$\underbrace{K_{t+1} - K_t}_1 = \underbrace{I_t}_2 - \underbrace{\delta K_t}_3$$

Net investment (term 1) equals gross investment (term 2) minus depreciation of existing capital (term 3)

Objective of the Firm


- The representative firm's manager maximizes the present value of net payments to owners of the firm ("share holders") using the market rate of interest to discount future payments (Modigliani-Miller Theorem)
- Profit in period t is:

$$\Pi_t = \underbrace{PF(N_t, K_t)}_{1} - \underbrace{WN_t}_{2} - \underbrace{P^II_t}_{3} - \underbrace{bP^II_t^2}_{4}$$

Profit (or cash flow) equals revenue (term 1) minus the wage bill (term 2) minus the purchase cost of new capital (term 3) minus the quadratic adjustment costs (term 4). See Figure 3.3

AEH and stability Building block: Investment Capital accumulation and stability

Figure 3.3: Adjustment costs of investment



Share Value Maximization

- Let us call the planning period "today" and normalize it to t=0
- The value of the firm in the stock market is:

$$\bar{V}_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \Pi_t$$
$$= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \left[PF(N_t, K_t) - WN_t - P^I I_t - bP^I I_t^2\right]$$

• The firm must choose paths for N_t and K_t (and thus for Y_t) such that \bar{V}_0 is maximized subject to the accumulation identity (and the initial capital stock, K_0)

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Share Value Maximization

• To solve the problem we use the method of Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L}_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \left[PF(N_t, K_t) - WN_t - P^I I_t - bP^I I_t^2\right] \\ - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda_t}{(1+R)^t} \left[K_{t+1} - (1-\delta)K_t - I_t\right]$$

- We need a whole *path* of Lagrange multipliers λ_t is the one relevant for the constraint in period t
- Note that we scale the Lagrange multipliers in order to facilitate interpretation later on

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First-Order Conditions

• First-order necessary conditions (FONCs) (for t = 0, 1, 2,):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_0}{\partial N_t} &= \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \left[PF_N(N_t, K_t) - W\right] = 0\\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_0}{\partial K_{t+1}} &= \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \left[\frac{PF_K(N_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) + \lambda_{t+1}(1-\delta)}{1+R} - \lambda_t\right] = 0\\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}_0}{\partial I_t} &= \left(\frac{1}{1+R}\right)^t \left[-P^I - 2bP^I I_t + \lambda_t\right] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

▶ Note the timing in the expression for $\partial \mathcal{L}_0 / \partial K_{t+1}!$

• There are no adjustment costs on labour. Hence the firm can vary employment freely in each period such that:

$$PF_N(N_t, K_t) = W$$

• The FONC for investment yields (for adjacent periods t and t+1):

$$\lambda_t = P^I \cdot [1 + 2bI_t]$$
$$\lambda_{t+1} = P^I \cdot [1 + 2bI_{t+1}]$$

• The FONC for capital is:

$$PF_K(N_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) + \lambda_{t+1}(1 - \delta) - \lambda_t(1 + R) = 0$$

• Substituting λ_t and λ_{t+1} into the FONC for capital gives:

$$0 = PF_{K}(N_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) + P^{I} \cdot [1 + 2bI_{t}] (1 - \delta)$$

- $P^{I} \cdot [1 + 2bI_{t}] (1 + R) \Leftrightarrow$
$$I_{t+1} = \frac{1 + R}{1 - \delta} I_{t} - \frac{PF_{K}(N_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) - P^{I}(R + \delta)}{2bP^{I}(1 - \delta)}$$
(S4)

- Eq. (S4) is an *unstable* difference equation: the coefficient for I_t is greater than 1 (as R > 0 and $0 < \delta < 1$)
- In general $I_t \to +\infty$ or $I_t \to -\infty$. But these are economically non-sensical solutions because adjustment costs for the firm will explode and thus firm profits and the value of the firm will go to $-\infty$

- But (S4) pins down only one economically sensible investment policy, namely the constant policy, for which $I_{t+1} = I_t = I$
- Solving (S4) for this policy yields:

$$I = \frac{1}{2b} \left[\frac{PF_K(N,K)}{P^I(R+\delta)} - 1 \right]$$
(S5)

where we have dropped the time subscripts to indicate that (S5) is a steady-state investment policy (we analyze the non-steady-state case in Chapter 4)

Let us assume that P^I = P (single good economy; no investment subsidy). Then (S5) simplifies to:

$$I = \frac{1}{2b} \left[\frac{F_K(N,K)}{R+\delta} - 1 \right]$$

- If there are no adjustment costs (b → 0) then the firm expresses a demand for *capital*. The demand for investment is not well-defined in that case, because there is no punishment for the firm in adjusting its stock of capital freely (i.e. I_t → +∞ or I_t → -∞ are no longer disastrous in that case)
- Formally, if $b \rightarrow 0$ then so must the term in square brackets:

$$\frac{F_K(N,K)}{R+\delta} - 1 = 0 \qquad \Leftrightarrow \qquad F_K = R + \delta$$

• Notice the parallel with the expression for labour demand in this case (the firm rents the use of the capital goods)

AEH and stability Building block: Investment Capital accumulation and stability

Summary Investment Model

• With adjustment costs, however, we have a well-defined investment equation which we write generally as:

$$I = I(R, K, Y), \quad I_R < 0, \ I_K < 0, \ I_Y > 0$$

• *Example* #1: Cobb-Douglas production function.

• *Example #2*: CES production function.

•
$$Y \equiv \left[(1-\alpha) K^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} + \alpha N(t)^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \right]^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}$$
 with $\sigma \ge 0$
• $F_K = (1-\alpha) (Y/K)^{\sigma}$

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Augmented IS-LM Model

- We can study the stock-flow interaction on the demand side of the economy, in the IS-LM model
- The model is:

$$Y = C(Y - T(Y)) + I(R, K, Y) + G$$
$$M/P = l(Y, R)$$
$$\dot{K} = I(R, K, Y) - \delta K$$

- We keep P and M fixed throughout
- IS-LM equilibrium yields:

$$Y = \Phi(\underbrace{K}_{-}, \underbrace{G}_{+})$$
$$R = \Psi(\underbrace{K}_{-}, \underbrace{G}_{+})$$

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
Test your understanding

**** Self Test ****

Draw IS-LM diagrams to rationalize the partial derivative effects for Y and R. Use Figure 3.4 to do so.

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Figure 3.4: Comparative static effects in the IS-LM model



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Capital Accumulation and Stability

• Capital dynamics is governed by:

$$\dot{K} = I(\underbrace{\Psi(P, K, G, M)}_{R}, K, \underbrace{\Phi(P, K, G, M)}_{Y}) - \delta K$$
$$\equiv \Omega(K, G)$$

- Note that the capital stock, *K*, appears in no less than *four* places on the right-hand side
- Hence, checking stability (by computing $\partial \dot{K}/\partial K$ and proving it is negative) is much more difficult
- A graphical approach will not help!

Capital Accumulation and Stability

• Formally we find:

$$d\dot{K} = \Omega_K dK + \Omega_G dG \tag{S6}$$

with the partial derivatives:

$$\Omega_K \equiv I_R \Psi_K + I_K + I_Y \Phi_K - \delta \tag{S7}$$

$$\Omega_G \equiv I_R \Psi_G + I_Y \Phi_G \tag{S8}$$

- Not at all guaranteed that Ω_K is negative (as is required for stability); the term $I_R \Psi_K > 0$ which is a "destabilizing" influence
- Appeal to the Samuelsonian Correspondence Principle (believe and use only stable models) and simply assume that $\Omega_K \equiv \partial \dot{K} / \partial K < 0$. This gets you information that is useful to determine the long-run effect of fiscal policy.

Stable Adjustment to Fiscal Policy Shock

• From (S6) we find that, assuming stability, $d\dot{K} = 0$ in the long run so that the long-run effect on capital is:

$$\left(\frac{dK}{dG}\right)^{LR} = -\frac{\Omega_G}{\Omega_K} = \frac{\bar{I}_R \Psi_G^+ + \bar{I}_Y^+ \Phi_G^+}{-\Omega_K}$$

where the denominator is positive for the stable case (since $\Omega_K < 0$)


• The long-run effect on capital of an increase in government consumption is ambiguous

Stable Adjustment to Fiscal Policy Shock

- Heated debate in the 1970s between monetarists (like Friedman) and Keynesians (like Tobin) (a.k.a. the "battle of the slopes"):
 - Friedman: a strong interest rate effect on investment ($|I_R|$ large), and a large effect on the interest rate but a small effect on output of a rise in government spending (Ψ_G large and Φ_G small). Consequently, a monetarist might suggest that $\partial \dot{K}/\partial G$ is negative: crowding out
 - Tobin: $|I_R|$ small, Ψ_G small, and Φ_G large, so that $\partial \dot{K}/\partial G > 0$: crowding in
 - Correspondence Principle does not settle the issue. Econometric studies could do so.
- In Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the two cases


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Figure 3.5: The effect on capital of a rise in public spending



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Figure 3.6: Capital accumulation and the Keynesian effects of fiscal policy



Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Intrinsic Dynamics and the Government Budget Constraint

- IS-LM is a little strange because:
 - It combines flow concepts (IS) and stock concepts (LM) in one diagram
 - It cannot be used to study effect of government financing method
- Blinder and Solow (1973) show how the IS-LM model can be extended with a government budget restriction. With their model we can study:
 - Money creation
 - Tax financing
 - Bond financing

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Key ingredients of the Blinder-Solow model

- Fixed price level, P = 1 (horizontal AS curve)
- Special type of bond, the consol, pays 1 euro from now until perpetuity
- If the interest rate is R the price of the bond would be:

$$P_B = \int_0^\infty 1e^{-R\tau} d\tau = -(1/R) \left[e^{-R\tau} \right]_0^\infty = \frac{1}{R}$$

- If there are B consols in existence than the "coupon payments" at each instant is $B\times 1~{\rm euros}$
- If the government emits new consols, $\dot{B}>0,$ then it receives $\dot{B}\times P_B$ in revenue from the bond sale
- ${\, \bullet \, }$ If the government issues new money, then $\dot{M}>0$

Key ingredients of the Blinder-Solow model

• The government budget constraint is:

$$G + B = T + \dot{M} + \frac{1}{R} \cdot \dot{B}$$

Government consumption plus coupon payments equals tax revenue plus money issuance plus revenue from new bond sales.

• Other changes to the IS-LM model:

$$T = T(Y + B), \qquad 0 < T_{Y+B} < 1$$

$$A \equiv \bar{K} + M/P + B/R, \qquad C = C(Y + B - T, A), \qquad 0 < C_{Y+B-T} < 1, \ C_A > 0$$

$$M/P = l(Y, R, A), \qquad l_Y > 0, \ l_R < 0, \ 0 < l_A < 1$$

Key ingredients of the Blinder-Solow model

New IS curve:

$$Y = C[\underbrace{Y + B - T(Y + B)}_{1}, \underbrace{\bar{K} + M/P + B/R}_{2}] + I(R) + G$$

where term ${\bf 1}$ is household disposable income, and term ${\bf 2}$ is total wealth

- We keep \bar{K} fixed
- "Quasi-reduced form" expressions for Y and R can be derived in the usual way:

$$Y = \Phi(G, B, M)$$
$$R = \Psi(G, B, M)$$
?

Key ingredients of the Blinder-Solow model

- We consider two prototypical cases
- Pure money financing $(\dot{M} \neq 0 \text{ and } \dot{B} = 0)$
- Pure bond financing ($\dot{M}=0$ and $\dot{B}\neq 0$)
- Key issues:
 - Is the model stable?
 - Relation between financing method and the government spending multiplier
 - How do the two cases compare?

Pure money financing $(M \neq 0, B = 0)$

• Money financing is stable:

$$\frac{\partial \dot{M}}{\partial M} \equiv -T_{Y+B}\Phi_M < 0$$

 Boost in government consumption causes an initial government deficit:

$$\frac{\partial \dot{M}}{\partial G} \equiv (1 - T_{Y+B}\Phi_G) > 0$$

• Long-run multiplier exceeds short-run multiplier:

$$\left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)_{MF}^{LR} \equiv \frac{1}{T_{Y+B}} > \Phi_G \equiv \left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)_{MF}^{SR}$$


- $\bullet\,$ Economic intuition: both IS and LM shift out, $Y\uparrow$, $T(Y)\uparrow$, deficit closes and $\dot{M}=0$
- See Figure 3.7 for the graphical illustration

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Figure 3.7: The effects of fiscal policy under money finance

(a) IS-LM diagram

(b) Phase diagram



Υ

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Pure bond financing $(\dot{M} = 0, \dot{B} \neq 0)$

• Bond financing may be unstable:

$$\frac{\partial \dot{B}}{\partial B} = 1 - \underset{0 < \cdot < 1}{T_{Y+B}} (1 + \Phi_B) \underset{?}{\stackrel{>}{=}} 0$$

Economic intuition: Φ_B is ambiguous because $B \uparrow$ shifts IS to the right (via consumption) but LM to the left (via money demand). Net effect ambiguous.

• But Samuelsonian "correspondence principle" helps:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial \dot{B}}{\partial B} &< 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad 1 - T_{Y+B}(1 + \Phi_B) < 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad \Phi_B > \frac{1 - T_{Y+B}}{T_{Y+B}} > 0 \end{split}$$

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Pure bond financing

 For the stable case the long-run multiplier again exceeds the short-run multiplier:


$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)^{LR}}_{BF} > \underbrace{\left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)^{SR}}_{BF}}_{G}$$

$$\Phi_G + \Phi_B \left(\frac{1 - T_{Y+B}\Phi_G}{1 - T_{Y+B}(1 + \Phi_B)}\right) > \Phi_G$$

• See Figure 3.8 for the graphical illustration

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Figure 3.8: The effects of fiscal policy under (stable) bond financing



Comparison money financing and bond financing

• The long-run (stable) bond-financed multiplier exceeds the long-run money-finance multiplier:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)^{LR}}_{BF} > \underbrace{\left(\frac{dY}{dG}\right)^{LR}}_{MF}}_{MF}$$

$$\Phi_G - \Phi_B \left(\frac{1 - T_{Y+B}\Phi_G}{1 - T_{Y+B}(1 + \Phi_B)}\right) > \frac{1}{T_{Y+B}}$$

- Economic intuition: under bond financing both increase in G and the additional interest payments (increase in B) must eventually be covered by higher tax receipts
- Since T = T(Y), it must be the case that Y rises by more
- See Figure 3.9 for the graphical illustration

Money financing Bond financing Comparing cases

Figure 3.9: Long run effects of fiscal policy under different financing modes

